No one involved at the start of the Airlift ever contemplated or imagined the dimensions that the Airlift would eventually assume. All that they knew was that they needed “a lot” of everything. Or as Clay had put it, all they could haul. RAF instructions were equally vague. The political leadership told the RAF – who it knew perfectly well was under-funded, under-staffed and short of aircraft – “to do their best.” As one of the RAF staff officers charged with organising the operation remarked: “‘something at once’ and ‘do your best’ hardly appeared the most well considered instructions issued at the start of a military operation.” [i] But one thing was glaringly obvious: the men tasked with carrying out the airlift lacked just about everything.     The most glaring deficiency at the start of the Airlift was in aircraft. The French were fully engaged in Indochina and sent their regrets from the start. The American transport fleet in Europe consisted on paper of 10...