RAF's Contribution in the Battle of the Atlantic
PM Winston Churchill in his memoirs claimed that the only thing that ever really frightened him was the U-boat threat to Britain's lines of supply across the Atlantic. While the burden of the fight to protect the merchant convoys fell to the Royal Navy, the RAF played an important role — some might even argue decisive — role in the Battle of the Atlantic. By the end of the war, Coastal Command aircraft had sunk 212 U-Boats, accounting for more than the Navy or Bomber Command. In addition, Bomber Command contributed to the fight by attacking capital ships (e.g. the Tirpitz) and, more successfully in the later years, U-boat and E-boat “pens” and factories.
The lion's share of the RAF's fight against the Kriegsmarine fell to Coastal Command. This command enjoyed so little attention that many who lived in Britain during the war may hardly have known it existed. The "Fighter Boys" had won the heart of a grateful nation by their heroic efforts in the Battle of Britain, and the "Bomber Boys" won the admiration of the public by their sheer persistence and dogged determination -- something seen (or at least heard) night after night as they flew over Britain. But Coastal Command flew below the radar screen and beyond the limelight of the general public. Operating far out to sea from bases on the fringes of the island, they were easily "out of sight and out of mind." Worse, according to historian Patrick Bishop, Coastal Command was "third in line" for resources as well.
In the early stages of the war, Coastal Command squadrons were tasked with attacking ports and Germany's capital ships with obsolete, slow and undefended aircraft. This led to some of the few cases of point-blank refusals to obey orders on the part of squadron commanders in the history of the RAF -- and to appalling losses. Fortunately, this phase of pig-headed action for the sake of satisfying the Royal Navy's screams for protection was comparatively short-lived. Coastal Command instead focused on more intelligent use of its resources in the role of reconnaissance aircraft which could locate targets and direct surface ships to their destruction.
In this role, Coastal Command contributed materially to victory. First and foremost, the patrols Coastal Command maintained over the approaches to the British isles were instrumental in disrupting U-boat attacks on these congested waterways. U-boats operated first and foremost on the surface, and dived to protect themselves and escape. By keeping the U-boats underwater in fear of their own lives, the aircraft of coastal command saved countless -- if measureless -- numbers of ships and lives. Such work, however, was extremely boring as the U-boats dived at the mere sound of aircraft engines and so the crews in the patrolling aircraft often never caught even a glimpse of the enemy.
By mid-1941, new aircraft suited to the tasks facing Coastal Command started to be deployed. These included the Catalina flying boat, with a range of 800 miles and the capacity to stay airborne for 17 hours at a stretch. Hudsons, Wellingtons and Whitleys passed on from Bomber Command had a range of 500 miles and were deployed to Iceland to increase convoy coverage. Most importantly, radar devices for detecting surfaces ships were developed that could be carried by the patrolling aircraft. Although primitive at first, eventually Coastal Command aircraft, particularly the B-24s loaned from the U.S., proved to be good at hunting down U-Boats. Unfortunately, there were never enough of them for the task. Coastal Command and the Navy repeatedly lost the war for resources to "Bomber Harris," who protected his fleet with bitter -- indeed blind an bigoted -- determination.
Nevertheless, Coastal Command fought on with the resources they had, compensating or lack of aircraft with devices to make each aircraft more effective. One such device was a bright beam that lit up the night. Once radar had detected a surfaced aircraft, the beam could be turned on to help guide the RAF aircraft to the target for an attack with depth charges or torpedoes. The beam had the added benefit of blinding the defenders. Unfortunately, the Germans soon developed a means to detect Coastal Command's airborne radar, giving U-boats enough warning to dive to safety.
In consequence, the risk of being lost to enemy action was very low. Instead, bad weather and fatigue were real dangers; many aircraft simply disappeared, with no one alive to tell why and how or where they went down. The most difficult aspect of the work, however, was that thousands and thousands of hours and miles were flown with no apparent impact on the war. This was highly demoralizing and it took a particularly stoic kind of man to fly these long, tedious patrols. Yet while the game of cat-and-mouse continued, weapons were gradually improving as were the number and bases for Coastal Command aircraft increased.
By the end of 1942, Coastal Command was gaining traction and could point to significant accomplishments. First and foremost, the Uboats had been driven into the center of the Atlantic and by the end of the year no longer dared to attack within 600 miles of the British Isles. Meanwhile, Coastal Command aircraft had sunk 31 U-boats. Most importantly, a new version of airborne radar had been developed which could not be detected by the victims. Combined with the search lights, U-Boats had become vulnerable at night. This lead the Kriegsmarine to issue a new directive in May 1943 -- not unlike Hitler's orders to the 6th Army at Stalingrad: henceforth German U-boats were not to dive at all, but rather stand and fight their attackers. The resulting engagements were often deadly -- on both sides. (An excellent example of this kind of encounter is provided in the following video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B-l6_TuSutI)
In the summer of 1943, Coastal Command opened an offensive concentrated on the Bay of Biscay. The Germans responded to their increasing losses with orders to their captains to sail in wolf packs and remain on the surface to use their anti-aircraft guns in a concentrated barrage. The result was a vicious and merciless struggle that resulted in the sinking of 16 U-boats in just on month -- but the loss of 14 RAF aircraft as well.
Such losses were unsustainable on both sides, and the RAF was probably (if secretly) relieved when orders to the U-boats were changed. Rather than standing and fighting, they were ordered to slink along the Spanish coast as far from British air bases as possible. Nevertheless, 1943 was the best year yet, with 90 U-boats were sunk and 51 damaged by aircraft of Coastal Command.
It was now clear that the tide was turning against the U-Boats. Although operations continued with significant losses on both sides, the outcome was no longer in doubt. The price, however, was huge. By the end of the war, Coast Command had lost 2,060 aircraft and 5,866 aircrew. The bulk of aircraft and crew were lost to weather and/or mechanical difficulties while far out at sea rather than to enemy action.
In addition to the efforts of Coastal Command against the U-boats at sea, RAF Bomber Command was engaged in repeated operations against the U-Boat pens (bases and repair facilities), U-Boat factories and the production facilities of U-Boat engines and other components. The RAF also made sporadic attacks against German capital ships, such as the the Tirpitz.
My novels about the RAF in WWII are intended as tributes to the men in the air and on the ground that made a victory against fascism in Europe possible.
they took the war to Hitler.
Their chances of survival were less than fifty percent.
Their average age was 21.
This is the story of just one bomber pilot, his crew and the woman he loved.
It is intended as a tribute to them all.
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"Where Eagles Never Flew" was the the winner of a Hemingway Award for 20th Century Wartime Fiction and a Maincrest Media Award for Military Fiction. Find out more at: https://crossseaspress.com/where-eagles-never-flew
For more information about all my aviation books visit: https://www.helenapschrader.com/aviation.html
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