Vengence of the Victims
Air Marshal Harris had warned during the Blitz in 1940 that Germany had sowed the wind and would reap the whirlwind. Later he astutely noted that the Germans had started the war under the "childish" assumption that they could bomb everybody else but no one was ever going to bomb them. They were wrong.
Although the Allied air counter-offensive took a long time to get off the ground, by the start of 1942, Bomber Command had enough of heavy bombers (of all three types) and enough trained crews to launch its first large raids. The Luftwaffe had sent nearly 1,000 aircraft, of which roughly 350 were bombers, against London on 7 September 1940. It was not until the night of May 30 1942 that the RAF reciprocated with its first "thousand" aircraft raid. But it came.
The target was Cologne, and significantly, all those aircraft were heavy bombers. The payload of the Luftwaffe's twin engine bombers during the Blitz averaged around 4400 lbs. The RAF's heavy bombers could carry 12,000 lbs of explosives over a much longer distance. In February 1942, Bomber Command dropped 1,000 tons (100,000 lbs) of bombs on the enemy. In March 1945, the peak month of the war, it delivered 67,637 tons (676,370 lbs) of high explosive. It might not have been the million kilos Hitler had boasted he would deliver (in a single night, no less!), but it was enough the wreck much of Germany's infrastructure.
The cost in life was commensurate. In individual raids where a fire storm was ignited, tens of thousands died. Hamburg was the first to experience this kind of hell in July 1943. An estimated 18,000 died, many of whom had taken refuge in the air raid shelters only to be asphyxiated when the fire storm sucked all the oxygen out of the center of the storm.
The most famous of the Allied retaliatory raids was, of course, the bombing of Dresden on the night of 23 February 1945. Here an estimated 25,000 - 35,000 people -- the latter number representing one tenth of the city's population -- were exterminated. Because there were also large numbers of refugees in the city whose name and residence were unknown to the authorities, it is widely assumed that the death toll was substantially higher, and some sources claim -- unconvincingly -- that over 100,000 people were killed. The strategic value of the raid hardly justified slaughter on this scale.
One of the last air raids of the war was an attack on Hitler's HQ at Berchtesgaden in the Bavarian alps. Crews were told that Hitler was believed to have sought refuge there and was digging in for a final fight. So, on 25 April, with 617 leading in the "Pathfinder" role, the RAF made an all-out assault on "The Eagles' Nest" -- as Hitler liked to call his fortified retreat. In addition to target marking, 617 aircraft were carrying "Tallboys." Participants on the operation report flying down over France then turning left as if heading for Munich before diverting to strike at Berchtesgaden. The bombers had fighter escort for the entire route and encountered no German fighters whatsoever. The flak, on the other hand, was intense, as one would expect from the SS defenders of Hitler's favorite residence. Visibility was good at altitude but ground mist partially obscured the target and 617 failed to pinpoint Hitler's personal complex. Instead, they pulverized the SS barracks and the defensive fortifications. That is, 617 and the 400 bombers of Main Force that followed them did. Although Hitler was not actually there at the time of the attack, most crews reported feeling a sense of satisfaction at striking at him personally. Yet it is hard to escape the impression that this 400+ raid on the German dictator's unoccupied home was "overkill." As at Dresden, two months earlier, the Allied Air Forces were flexing their muscles and showing the might more than fulfilling strategic objectives.
Altogether, although the exact number is not known, it is widely agreed that Germany lost more than 600,000 lives in the Allied bombing offensive, or roughly ten-times what Britain had suffered. Raids like those on Dresden and Berchtesgaden in the last months of the war had more to do with vengeance and hubris than military utility. If awesome as this steamroller of destruction must have seemed, it was neither invulnerable or invincible. Most importantly, it was not made of technology and machines alone. The RAF never had "flying bombs" or rockets. All its explosives were delivered by men. As Noel Coward's poem "Lie in the Dark" reminds us, inside those machines were "bones and muscles and minds and hearts."
By
the end of the war, 55,573 men had given their lives in the RAF's
bomber offensive. Another 8,403 had tried trying to get there -- in
training accidents. Overall only 35% of those who became operational
survived to see the end of the war. Of course the chances of survival
varied over the course of the war. In the Battle of France, flying for
bomber command was effectively suicidal. In early 1943 they were a
little better: aircrew stood a 17% chance of surviving a tour of 30
operational missions and a 2.5% chance of surviving two. By the end of
the war, casualty rates were much reduced and the prospects of
completing a tour were considerably better. Enabling the rough average
of a 40% chance of surviving one tour and 20% chance of surviving two.
Yet men kept volunteering, and the RAF never lacked for volunteers. This was largely because for
the greater part of the war, RAF Bomber Command was viewed by civilians
and aircrew alike as the only means of striking back at Hitler for the
damage, destruction and misery he had inflicted.
My novels about the RAF in WWII are intended as tributes to the men in the air and on the ground that made a victory against fascism in Europe possible.
they took the war to Hitler.
Their chances of survival were less than fifty percent.
Their average age was 21.
This is the story of just one bomber pilot, his crew and the woman he loved.
It is intended as a tribute to them all.
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"Where Eagles Never Flew" was the the winner of a Hemingway Award for 20th Century Wartime Fiction and a Maincrest Media Award for Military Fiction. Find out more at: https://crossseaspress.com/where-eagles-never-flew
For more information about all my aviation books visit: https://www.helenapschrader.com/aviation.html
People in today's world of "minor skirmishes' fail to take into account the psychological aspect of war.
ReplyDeleteOne side is "down-hearted and beaten," the other side is "jubilant and winning." All of a sudden; Cologne in Europe and Jimmy Doolittle in Asia. The entire "tone" of the war changes.
Hitler thought Germany couldn't be touched and he promised that to the German people. Tojo thought Japan couldn't be touched -- just look at the size of the Pacific ocean -- and made the same promise to the Japanese people.
Both men were wrong. And the psycholocil balance of the war tipped, forever. The Allies really won the war with Cologne and Tokyo.
Another excellent article/lesson, Professor. Always looking forward to more.